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ABSTRACT
In recent years, European states have institutionalised relations with
Islamic groups in the form of national Islam councils. Similarly, muni-
cipalities have set up more or less comparable bodies to address
issues related to urban religious diversity. However, rather than being
restricted to Muslim representatives, municipal consultative bodies
usually incorporate a variety of religious actors. This article analyses
three such bodies in the French cities of Rennes, Bordeaux, and
Toulouse. Adopting a governance perspective and drawing on qua-
litative ﬁeldwork, I argue that by providing concrete advice on how to
address religious issues, these bodies deﬁne what are considered
‘acceptable’ and ‘non-acceptable’ public religious expressions, ulti-
mately inﬂuencing normative ideas about laïcité. Moreover, I argue
that the history of relationships between religious and municipal
authorities and the political culture of the cities, among other factors,
shape these local processes, thereby emphasising the distinct role of
cities and urban actors in governing religion.
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Since the early 2000s, in an attempt to assert their national sovereignty, many European
democracies have set up representation bodies to nationalise Islam andmake it ﬁt into their
institutional frameworks of church-state relations. In France, the UK, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Spain, governments have opted for this type of national body to institu-
tionalise relationships with Muslim organisations. However, such bodies do not only oﬀer
Islamic communities symbolic recognition and oﬃcial representation before the state. They
also work as regulatory bodies by which the conditions for the exercise of religious freedom
and the practice of religion are established (Laurence 2012; Zeghal 2005).
More recently, multiple municipal governments in countries across Europe have set up
similar consultative bodies to address issues related to religion and religious diversity in
their cities, albeit more limited in remit, size, and competences. Although oﬃcially these
local bodies focus on the public practice of religion in general rather than exclusively on
Islamic religious practice, they can be understood as similar institutional developments
emerging at local level.
Three such municipal consultative bodies in France, the Rennes Consultative Committee
on Secularism (Comité consultatif laïcité de Rennes), Bordeaux Sharing (Bordeaux Partage),
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and Toulouse Fraternity – Council on Secularism (Toulouse Fraternité – Conseil de la laïcité)
form the empirical focus of this article. These urban consultative bodies are instruments of
institutionalised participation in which individual citizens or representatives of social groups
are invited to discuss salient policy issues. In the context of policies on religion, these are
usually participatory bodies to which municipalities invite representatives of diverse reli-
gious groups and other civil society organisations to discuss the city’s approach to religious
issues. These governance bodies are particularly intriguing in the case of France, where
interactions between the state and religious actors are highly contested. In this article
I analyse these three local bodies as public policy instruments for the governance of
religious diversity and, speciﬁcally, for the governance of Islam.
Thus far, research has identiﬁed the widespread adoption of public consultation as
a policy tool in the governance of religion, and in the governance of Islam in particular
(Fourot 2015; Torrekens 2012). These studies have paid attention to the composition of
such local consultative bodies, highlighting the contested nature of the selection of
religious representatives, in particular Muslim ones, the exclusion of certain actors, and
the power imbalances between state and religious representatives (Duthu 2009;
Fournier 2009; Lamine 2004a). However, we lack a more thorough understanding of
how these bodies aﬀect the regulation of religion.
In this article I analyse the concrete ways in which the work of these bodies contributes
the guiding ideas about 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' forms of public religiosity that
ultimately inform broader normative and political understandings of laïcité and the place of
religion in the public sphere.1 Based on the analysis of three cases in France, I argue that
these municipal bodies are more than spaces for dialogue, the sharing of knowledge, and
the promotion of mutual understanding between religious groups – all of which are
explicitly stated aims. They are also spaces for the ‘localisation’ of Islam, mirroring processes
of its ‘domestication’ at national level. In other words, in their negotiations of religious
diversity, these bodies serve as venues where the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ and ‘unaccep-
table’ public (Islamic) religious practices are drawn and adjusted to speciﬁc local conditions.
Moreover, with their ‘localisation’ of broader debates about the place of religion in public
life into urban contexts, these bodies contribute to the production and rooting of normative
ideas about laïcité, and serve as spaces for the (re-)socialisation of various actors, in particular
Muslim local leaders, into this republican principle.
Unlike previous studies, which – with a few notable exceptions (Duthu 2009; Körs and
Nagel 2018; Lamine 2004a) – have mostly analysed a single municipal body (Torrekens
2012) or compared bodies across countries (Griera, Giorda, and Fabretti 2018), I compare
three such bodies within one national context. In doing so I brieﬂy examine how local
factors – including the history of relations between local political and religious authorities,
the political culture of the city, the political aﬃliation of the ruling party, and local violent
events – inﬂuence the ways these bodies work, their implications for policymaking, and the
normative deﬁnitions of acceptable religious expressions derived from the discussions in
such bodies.
Moreover, the study contributes to a better understanding of how the meanings of
the notion of laïcité vary as the principle is put into practice locally by a variety of actors.
In doing so, it considers cities, alongside central states, as sites of the governance of
religious diversity. While often omitted in the sociological literature on the governance
of religious diversity, cities are increasingly receiving attention from scholars in this ﬁeld
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(Martínez-Ariño 2018). This is partly because, as this article shows, cities can shape
policies on religion in signiﬁcant ways. This ﬁnding challenges the commonly held
assumption that policies on religion in France are almost exclusively an aﬀair of the
central state.
This article draws on the analysis of qualitative empirical material collected in Rennes,
Bordeaux, and Toulouse between November 2015 and January 2017. These cities were
selected based on some of their similarities and diﬀerences. They are medium-sized cities
and regional economic centres in France. In all three cases the percentage of foreign-born
populations was below 15% in 2014 (Insee 2014), and electoral support for the National
Front (Front National, since 2018 Rassemblement National) in municipal elections did not
exceed 10%. However, they are ruled by diﬀerent political parties: the Socialist Party (Parti
Socialiste) in Rennes since 1977, conservatives (since 2015 Les Républicains) in Bordeaux
since 1947, and both in alternation in Toulouse. Moreover, while Rennes has a long history
of strong Catholic predominance and good relations between the city’s Catholic milieu and
the ruling Socialist Party, Bordeaux has a longer tradition of religious diversity in municipal
political life (Malogne-Fer 2019), and Toulouse’s social, political, and religious life was shaken
by a direct terrorist attack in 2012.
This study combines semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and participant
observation. In each city I interviewed politicians and staﬀ of the municipal administra-
tions, religious actors, secularist groups, other civil society associations and NGOs. I also
collected documents produced by the municipalities and other relevant urban actors
and participated in the monthly meetings of the consultative body in Rennes between
November 2015 and June 2016.
Municipal governance of religious diversity: a public policy instruments
approach
The place of religion in the public sphere and the relationship between states and religious
organisations are mostly regulated at national level through constitutions and laws, and
more recently through bodies such as national Islam councils. The later can be understood
as neo-corporatist institutions, comparable to labour unions or other forms of group interest
representation, which aim at submitting Islamic communities to the rule of the state by
granting them oﬃcial recognition and participation in policymaking (Laurence 2012).
Although for the most part research has examined how diﬀerent state–church
arrangements result in diﬀerent approaches to dealing with religious diversity (Soper
and Fetzer 2007), there have been calls for greater attention to be paid to other levels of
regulation, including cities and the role of urban actors (Bowen 2007; Giorgi and Itçaina
2015, 2016). Studies have examined a variety of municipal administrative practices and
their relevance to the governance of religious diversity (Martínez-Ariño 2018). These
include issues related to urban planning and its impact on the spatial presence of
religions (Gale 2008), the banning of certain religious symbols in urban spaces, such
as the burqa (Burchardt and Griera 2019), and religious dietary provisions in municipal
school canteens (Binet 2016; Papi 2012). Research has also examined the increasing role
of Muslim actors in governance at diﬀerent levels, from the local to the national (O’Toole
et al. 2013), with an emphasis on their institutionalisation in urban settings (De
Galembert 2006). All these studies emphasise the relevance of local conditions, such
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as conceptions of public space and the role of municipal bureaucracies, in understand-
ing the governance of religious diversity. Nonetheless, more research on the municipal
level is needed because, as Giorgi and Itçaina (2016, 6) have argued, ‘local politics often
become the place of experimentation with innovative policies’ that operate within
a particular set of constraints and opportunities.
Two conceptual frameworks constitute the general background to this article: the
governance framework and the policy instruments framework. In relation to the ﬁrst,
scholars agree that a transformation in the traditional ways of steering societies has led to
a new situation in relation to governance, one in which non-state actors, alongside govern-
ments, increasingly take part in policymaking and implementation (Klijn 2008). I analyse the
consultation bodies in order to capture how both state and non-state actors are involved in
policymaking. Secondly, in my analysis I draw on the literature on public policy instruments,
understanding them not only as ‘concrete and speciﬁed operational forms of intervention
by public authorities’ (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung 1998, 4), but also as tools that
condense a certain ‘form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it’
(Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007, 3).
In the current context of governance, instruments of ‘participatory governance’ (Cornwall
2008, 271) are increasingly considered appropriate to the task of addressing diﬀerent policy
issues. One such instrument is what Cornwall (2004) refers to as ‘invited spaces’, that is,
intermediate institutions provided by the government in which only a small group of
‘articulate elite community members’ (6) is chosen to represent the interests of larger
population groups. These instruments serve to make policy decisions and legitimise others
that have already been taken (Aarsæther, Nyseth, and Bjørnå 2011), as well as to work as
forums for civic education. Their development is aﬀected by contextual factors, such as the
attitudes of the ruling powers towards participation and the political culture and cultural
practices of decision-making in each context (Cornwall 2004).
One such type of invited space, local consultative bodies, has become a common
policy tool whereby cities deal with policy issues such as the integration of immigrants,
cultural diversity, gender equality, and public housing. Similar governance instruments
are also becoming common in religion policies. While some are single-issue participatory
processes, like the case reported by Conti (2016) of discussions over the building of
mosques in Italian cities, in other cases, like those in my study, such bodies are long-
term initiatives not restricted to just one issue. Similarly, interfaith bodies have often
served as policy tools for the governance of religious diversity in urban contexts: they
promote intercultural understanding and social cohesion, disseminate knowledge about
religion, and may prevent conﬂicts from emerging (Dick and Nagel 2017; Griera 2012;
Griera and Forteza 2011; Griera and Nagel 2018).
Following Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007), in this article I analyse the three municipal
consultative bodies as public policy instruments. They are comparable devices commis-
sioned by the respective municipal governments to address religious issues, which
deﬁne a certain relationship between the government and the governed and carry
normative understandings of what is acceptable religiosity in urban public spaces. The
three committees are just one example of institutionalised mechanisms of consultation
that work as a form of invited participation and select members according to pre-
deﬁned religious categories (Burchardt 2018).
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After commenting on the composition of each of the three bodies and the rationale
and motivations underlying their existence, the analysis below focuses on the ways in
which these bodies may inﬂuence policymaking. Ultimately, I am interested in under-
standing how institutionalised participation may shape normative deﬁnitions of public
religiosity and understandings of laïcité.
Religion in consultative bodies: a tale of three French cities
In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan terrorist attacks, the French autho-
rities reinforced the state’s commitment to ‘republican principles’, including laïcité.
A stronger emphasis on this notion, alongside stricter policies in the realm of national
security, came to the fore in public and political debates. At city level too, municipal
authorities felt compelled to intervene urgently in order to prevent conﬂicts arising in
their cities. However, municipal measures to address religious issues were in place in
French and other European cities long before these attacks.
Despite France being a centralised country, the decentralisation policies of the 1980s
signiﬁcantly changed its territorial structure, giving more power to cities (Thoenig 2005).
While cities in France do not have explicit competencies in respect of religious issues,
policies that aﬀect religious practice – such as on urban planning and school canteens –
fall under the competence of municipalities. In parallel, there is a trend towards promot-
ing mechanisms of deliberative and participatory democracy, which municipal autho-
rities use, among other things, to improve management and ﬁght communautarisme
(Jouve 2005).2 Despite France’s legal separation of church and state, participatory
devices have also spread in the ﬁeld of religion, and religious actors are increasingly
conceived as governance partners because they provide urban political authorities with
important resources (De Galembert 2006; Lamine 2004b). The three participatory bodies
in this study constitute ‘invited spaces’ in which the municipality invites diﬀerent urban
actors, including religious actors, to participate.
Rennes
The ﬁrst case is the Rennes Consultative Committee on Secularism (Comité consultatif
laïcité de Rennes), set up by the mayor of the city in 2015. Rennes, capital of the Brittany
region, has witnessed the arrival of ethnically and religiously diverse populations. The
municipal government (led by the Socialist Party for over forty years) has a strong public
interventionist character, also in the realm of religion policies, and a strong tradition of
Christian democracy, inﬂuenced by progressive Christian organisations (Le Galès 1993).
This situation, connected to a dense fabric of civil society associations, is crucial in
understanding the rather strong participatory character of its local political culture and
the composition and modus operandi of the consultative body.
The Rennes Consultative Committee on Secularism was part of the 2014 municipal
electoral programme of the Socialist Party. However, it was not established until after the
Charlie Hebdo and Hypercacher attacks. Formed by some forty local actors that are deemed
to represent diﬀerent community interests, the committee meets on a monthly basis and
works as an advisory body for the municipal government. Alongside religious actors,
representatives of the municipal government and members of municipal groups in the
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city council, city oﬃcials, representatives of secularist groups, freemasons, NGOs, experts,
and a school representative sit on the committee. While this selection is broad, it is often
criticised as including only actors likely to be sympathetic to the political stance of the
municipality. Moreover, it is notable that the local branch of the National Federation of Free
Thought, a small atheist association (La libre pensée), declined an invitation to participate
because its members felt that by inviting religious representatives to the committee the
municipality was violating the separation between church and state established in the
1905 law. As one of its members put it during our interview: ‘We are ready to be
interviewed by the mayor, but not to discuss living together with priests’.
The main and most immediate aim of the body in Rennes, after exchanging informa-
tion about the practice of laïcité in the city – understood in this case as state secularism
and the regulation of religion – and monitoring its application, was to draft a local
charter of laïcité. Once approved by the municipal council, the charter would be
implemented in the municipal administration and was also intended to serve as
a useful resource for other actors. The municipal authorities thought that this would
be an appropriate tool providing guidance in a simple and clear way, like the ‘Charter for
secularism in school’ (Charte de la laïcité à l’école) published by the Ministry of National
Education in 2013 in the form of a poster to be displayed in all public schools. Local
actors in Rennes were involved in diﬀerent stages of the process, from discussing the
issues at stake to gathering relevant information from various stakeholders and ﬁnally
oﬀering concrete advice in support of action by the municipality. Interviews were held
with local actors to establish the concerns of the population and to complement issues
to be addressed proposed by the municipality itself.
This participatory process, which is part of a citywide plan to include citizens in local
policymaking called the Citizen Factory (La Fabrique Citoyenne), is justiﬁed by drawing on
the city’s long history of citizen participation. Participation was seen by many of my
interviewees as ‘the way of doing things in Rennes’, as well as a way of ‘utilising’ the
resources already available in the city’s civil society infrastructure. Moreover, this tradition
of relating to non-state actors also includes religious actors, mainly as a result of the city’s
long history of Christian democracy in the twentieth century characterised by smooth
relations between urban politicians and Catholic actors. Including religious actors in this
‘laïcité partnership’was justiﬁed as a natural step, in harmony with the city’s political culture.
Bordeaux
The second case is the series of yearly interreligious conferences called Bordeaux Sharing
(Bordeaux Partage), running since 2010. The historical presence of a large representation of
Protestants and Jews among the foreign commercial bourgeoisie in the city of Bordeaux,
capital of the Gironde region, is reﬂected today in the close relationships between the
mayor and some religious leaders. Similarly, the political culture in Bordeaux is very much
centred on strong (conservative) mayors, as evidenced by the duration of their oﬃce
(between 1945 and 2019 there were only two mayors in Bordeaux, with a brief temporary
mayor in post between 2004 and 2006).
The mayor of Bordeaux established the body for interreligious dialogue, in which
diﬀerent topics are approached from the perspective of a selection of the major
religions in the city, in order to further mutual knowledge and dialogue. In this case,
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in contrast to developments in Rennes and Toulouse, no direct link exists between
a speciﬁc violent event and the setting up of this governance structure. However, in
this period recurrent debates over the building of a large mosque in the city (Joﬀrin
2014) led to a scrutinising of the mayor’s support for the project. Accused in social
media of being too permissive with radical Islam and too close to the main imam of
the city, Alan Juppé probably saw the creation of this body as a way to regain his
own legitimacy by showcasing the support he enjoyed from the leaders of the main
religious groups in the city.
In Bordeaux, the composition of the body is limited to representatives of religious
groups, the mayor, and a deputy mayor. Visually the arrangement consists of the mayor
surrounded by prominent religious ﬁgures, some of them with high media proﬁles,
evidence of a more personalistic style of governing. In the mayor’s own words, Bordeaux
Sharing is ‘a small body where I gather the cardinal, the rabbi, the Protestant pastor, the
imam and the representative of the Buddhists to share the republican values we hold in
common’ (emphasis mine).3 While at some point members discussed whether secular
actors (Freemasons and atheists) who had sought to participate should be accepted,
they ﬁnally rejected that option.
The rationale behind the establishment of such a body in Bordeaux was to oﬀer an open
forum where representatives from various religious groups are able to discuss topical issues
with each other from the perspectives of their respective religions. Thus far, topics of
discussion have included the role of women in religion, the role of religion in conﬂict and
violence, and the role of religious groups in welcoming foreigners. The body is conceived as
an interreligious forum moderated by the mayor and concerned to institutionalise already
existing bottom-up initiatives of interreligious dialogue. One explicit aim is to show the
contribution that religions can make to the process of living together.4 Another goal is to
show that religions can live well with one another, that they can talk to each other, and that
there is no conﬂict between them. Moreover, religious actors participating in this body are
seen by the municipality as messengers both from and to their communities. From a more
critical standpoint, however, this body can be seen as a strategic tool the mayor may use to
foster the political legitimacy of his decisions among certain populations. Unlike the case of
Rennes, no explicit mention is made regarding policy advice or participation in decision-
making in the description of this body. In this sense, the rationale behind it is more one of
‘displaying’ a speciﬁc, normative view of the presence of religions in the city’s public sphere,
and of the contributions they make, than one that stresses their role in informing
policymaking.
Toulouse
The third case is Toulouse Fraternity –Council on Secularism (Toulouse Fraternité – Conseil de la
laïcité). Toulouse, capital of the Occitanie region, has a long history of immigration. In contrast
to the other two cities, Toulouse has seen frequent political alternation between left- and
right-wing parties in its municipal government, and its political culture has been strongly
aﬀected by the terrorist attack on a Jewish school perpetrated by a local inhabitant in 2012.
Toulouse Fraternity replaced an earlier consultative body installed in May 2013 after this
attack. Set up as an emergency response to the attack and in pursuit of a strategy to prevent
tension escalating in the local community, the aim of the earlier Toulouse City Council on
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Secularism (Conseil de la Laïcité de la Ville de Toulouse) was to promote the principle of laïcité
and advise the municipality on issues related to religion. In December 2014 the new
conservative municipal government replaced it with a body called Toulouse Fraternité –
Conseil de la laïcité. Although this is presented as a continuation of the previous council, the
name emphasises the new body’s task of promoting fraternité. This shift, together with the
stronger emphasis put on the role of religious groups, was strongly criticised by the socialist
opposition. The composition of the Toulouse council closely resembles that of the commit-
tee in Rennes in including diﬀerent civil society actors alongside religious representatives.
The list of religious traditions included in all three bodies, namely Buddhism, Catholicism,
Islam, Judaism, Orthodox Christianity, and Protestantism, is seen as exhausting the possibi-
lities of religious representation. When one city oﬃcial explained the composition of
Toulouse Fraternity to me, he said ‘all religions are there’. This indicates that there is
a clear understanding of what does and does not constitute a religion from the perspective
of state actors setting up urban governance networks. The religious groups involved reﬂect
the tradition of bottom-up interfaith dialogue in the three cities. Pentecostal churches,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, less established branches of Islam, Hindus, and other smaller groups
are not even considered. Of particular concern to state actors is which Muslim actors should
be deemed ‘appropriate’ and ‘representative’ of the whole group of Muslims. In Toulouse as
well, the local branch of the National Federation of Free Thought association adopted a very
critical stance towards the consultative body.
The setting up of the initial Council on Secularism (laïcité) may be understood as an eﬀort
to calm the situation after the terrorist attack on the Jewish school. Following the attack the
municipal authorities perceived the prevention of potential local conﬂicts as needing to come
from within the religious ﬁeld as well as from the state. The initiative was also an attempt to
show that the issue was not a matter of conﬂict between local religious groups. Thus, in this
case, the existence of a violent event in the city was a critical juncture that very much
inﬂuenced the body’s creation and direction. Its more explicit tasks were ‘to advise the
mayor in matters related to the application of laïcité’, such as the management of public
space in relation to religious demonstrations, to promote dialogue to ﬁght communitarianism,
and to organise events at themayor’s request. Since being reconﬁgured in 2014, the emphasis
has been on promoting the value of fraternity and on recognising the diﬀerent spiritualities
that ‘constitute the soul of the city’, according to the minutes of the municipal council.
Implications for policymaking and the deﬁnitions of ‘acceptable’ religiosity
In Rennes, drafting the ‘Rennes Charter on Secularism’ (Charte rennaise de la laïcité) was the
main and immediate goal of the body, which acted proactively rather than reacting to
pressing issues. Discussions in the committee were goal-oriented, informed by the prag-
matic aim of providing responses to speciﬁc situations: after taking stock of the state of
aﬀairs in the city regarding particular issues, such as menus in school canteens and the
provision of plots for religious groups in municipal cemeteries, members discussed poten-
tial challenges, gathered knowledge, and made recommendations as necessary. In cases
where agreement among members was not possible, the diﬀerent positions were
recorded. The ﬁnal document, containing the debates and very detailed recommendations,
was presented to the municipal council, which immediately agreed to commission the
committee to pursue concrete measures regarding, for instance, the provision of various
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menus (one without meat, one without pork, etc.)5 in school canteens. The city council also
agreed that the committee would continue to put forward advice at the request of the
municipal government until the end of the council’s term in oﬃce in 2020.
Along with analysis of the ﬁnal document, my participation in the meetings of
the committee allowed me to observe the degree of detail in the discussions held.
I will illustrate this with two examples. The ﬁrst one relates to requests by muni-
cipal employees for permission to pray during working hours. The committee
indicated in its recommendations that the neutrality of public services prohibited
prayer at work. However, this position assumes that prayer is noticeable by others,
otherwise how could it be prohibited? The committee’s discussions concerned
Muslim workers. Some committee members stated that the fact that some employ-
ees had requested permission to pray during working hours indicated that they had
not understood that prayer may be done privately in silence, without anyone else
noticing. A preference for privatised and invisible forms of religiosity was shared by
most of the committee members. Interestingly, secular and secularist actors drew
explicitly on Catholic understandings of religious practices (individual silent prayer)
as the default template in assessing certain situations and providing recommenda-
tions. Without much conscious awareness, theological considerations were brought
into discussions in a state-led setting.
The second example refers to another intensively discussed issue, namely whether
women wearing the veil could accompany school outings. This discussion emerged follow-
ing debates triggered by a 2012 circular of the Ministry of Education which assumed that
these supervisors had to comply with the neutrality rules of the education system. The
committee did not reach a consensus on this but the majority of its members favoured
allowing veiled mothers to take part in school outings. The fact that no (veiled) Muslim
woman was invited to take part in a discussion aﬀecting them directly was very telling of
how these women are often seen as passive subjects. The impossibility of listening to the
voices of the women potentially aﬀected compelled some non-Muslim religious leaders to
dismiss the debate as outrageous and as curtailing freedom of religion generally.
In the case of Bordeaux, the body does not generate explicit outcomes that shape
political decisions and policy measures addressing religious diversity, nor is it expected to.
The fact that relations between religious groups and the political authorities assume amore
personalised shape (Malogne-Fer 2019), as is also evident in Bordeaux Sharing, goes hand in
hand with the existence of fewer regulations and administrative procedures regarding
religion. Bordeaux Sharing works instead as a source of legitimacy for the mayor and his
decisions, as a resource the mayor can mobilise at diﬀerent moments, especially moments
of ‘crisis’ such as after a terrorist attack, in order to prevent misunderstandings and
confrontations,6 and as a model for harmonious relations between groups. As presented
on the city’s website, this shared aim of living well together ‘has allowed us to prevent
external conﬂicts disrupting the life of the neighbourhoods’.7 Public events of this type of
body can be seen as ‘ceremonial areas in which participation [is] ritualised’ (Cornwall 2004,
5), rather than actual settings for active citizen participation. The staging of ‘interreligious
understanding’ as a public performance, then, suggests a diﬀerent way of dealing with
religious issues. In this case, it is more a politics of big names, where themayor and themost
prominent representatives of the diﬀerent religious groups gather in a highly visible event.
It is thus by establishing a visible model (Brighenti 2007, 334) of good religion, and good
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relations between religions, that the municipality tries to inﬂuence the behaviour and
attitudes of the wider population. As presented in the ‘Calendar of living together’, pub-
lished annually by the municipality in collaboration with the members of Bordeaux Sharing,
this interfaith body ‘is a valuable tool for living together due to its symbolic value’. Moreover,
by discussing the contribution of religions to speciﬁc social issues, such as the reception of
immigrants, the body displays an understanding of laïcité that emphasises and recognises
the positive role that religions may play in public life.
Toulouse Fraternity, like the committee in Rennes, aims to oﬀer advice to the municipal
government on matters related to religion. Since its conception, it has generated outcomes
in the form of reﬂections and recommendations that have informed subsequent political
decisions. One such example is the ‘Charter of republican principles and values’ (Charte des
principes et valeurs républicaines), which the municipality wanted all associations receiving
public funding to sign as proof of their commitment to these values, including references to
laïcité. Before the decision that all associations ﬁnanced by the city had to sign this charter
was made and approved, the municipal government requested that Toulouse Fraternity
reformulate the text. In drafting it, this body contributed to establishing a ‘soft’ way of
regulating the behaviour of local associations in relation to religion (e.g. preventing prose-
lytising) and the principle of laïcité. Although the work of Toulouse Fraternity had a less
clearly deﬁned outcome than was the casewith the Rennes charter on secularism, it has also
had immediate implications for policymaking in relation to the regulation of religion. While
it has not provided a long catalogue of detailed recommendations as in the Rennes
document, Toulouse Fraternity issued the guide ‘Secularism and public space’ (Laïcité et
espace public). This document refers to the legal framework regarding issues such as
religious celebrations in public spaces and the wearing of the so-called ‘burkini’ on public
beaches, and suggests ways to improve speciﬁc local situations. This body has also oﬀered
advice on other matters, for example in relation to dietary provisions (i.e. oﬀering a menu
without meat) in school canteens. Interestingly, when communicating the new model of
menus to families, the emphasis was put on nutrition rather than religious matters, thereby
preventing potential controversy from emerging. Brieﬂy, while the degree of detail and
intervention is signiﬁcantly lower than in the case of Rennes, andwhile thework of this body
did not start out from an all-encompassing approach to religious issues in the city, it also has
a regulatory nature.
Moreover, beyond the ﬁnal outcomes in the form of recommendations, policy docu-
ments, and oﬃcial statements, discussions within Toulouse Fraternity reveal the diﬀerent
understandings of laïcité among its members.8 While for some political actors on the left
laïcité should be understood exclusively as freedom of conscience and the neutrality of state
institutions, for members of the current government laïcité is understood as ‘inter-cultuel’
(interfaith) and the promotion of the value of fraternity and living together. Beyond political
diﬀerences in the meanings attached to laïcité, which are not exclusive to this particular
local context but reﬂect diﬀerences in partisan aﬃliation, other discussions reﬂect particula-
rities of the local context that aﬀect ideas about public religion and the meanings attached
to laïcité. In particular, the impact of the terrorist attack in Toulouse is reﬂected in the
emphasis put on measures aiming to reinforce knowledge of and commitment to so-called
republican values, and the capacity of diﬀerent groups to live together peacefully.
Ultimately, this shows that the meanings given to the notion of laïcité, as this principle is
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put into practice on the ground by various actors, are varied, which challenges homogenis-
ing understandings of state secularism in France.
This analysis has shown that, similar to national Islam councils, local consultative bodies
play a role in deﬁning ‘acceptable’ religion. For instance, they deﬁne which options are
preferable in relation to the provision of menus in school canteens, the regulation of
religious practice at work, and the diﬀerent modalities available to address and support or
restrict the construction of places of worship. Albeit in diﬀerent ways, they all display and
promote both a rather privatised form of religious practice, considered compatible with
republican ideals, and non-conﬂictual relations between groups.
While the main concerns relate to Islam, including a variety of religious groups and non-
religious associations in these bodies rather than limiting the selection to Islamic actors (as
in the case of national councils) avoids establishing too strong a focus on Islamic groups. It
also serves to ensure the neutrality of public engagement with religious groups (Lamine
2004a). Furthermore, the presence of diﬀerent religious groups mediates state regulation of
Islam, thereby sometimes softening potential attempts to limit certain (Islamic) religious
expressions (as the example of the veiled mothers in Rennes illustrates). Ultimately these
bodies provide practical examples of how religious groups themselves, and other state and
non-state actors, become active in regulating religion and promoting a ‘pedagogy of laïcité’,
which aims to make this notion understandable and accessible to the public. Next to their
explicit outcomes, these participatory devices can be interpreted as ‘schools of democracy’
that shape the civic culture of citizens and ‘re-socialise’ community leaders into republican
virtues. In this sense, these municipal councils partly resemble neo-corporatist state-society
governance arrangements, as suggested by Laurence (2012) in his examination of national
Islam councils. By institutionalising consultation and selecting representatives of diﬀerent
religions deemed to be attuned with the political agenda of the municipalities, these local
councils reduce the potential for conﬂict and mediate the demands of religious groups,
particularly Islamic ones, at the local level.
However, despite these similarities, these bodies also diﬀer in some respects. In what
follows, I will show how some local speciﬁcities – such as the relationship between municipal
and religious authorities, political constellations, and the political culture – shape their
functioning and outcomes.
The compositions of these three bodies, which diﬀer slightly across cities, reﬂect the
diﬀerent history of relations and roles attributed to religious groups. This inﬂuences the
resulting visions of laïcité and normative ideas about public religiosity. The Rennes
Consultative Committee on Secularism and Toulouse Fraternity adopt a broad approach
to the selection of actors, recognising that not only religious but also secular actors should
be involved in issues related to religion and the deployment of laïcité, whatever that may
mean in each context. Moreover, as the text of the ‘Rennes Charter on Secularism’ states,
provided that neutrality is respected the inclusion of religious representatives indicates an
assumption that laïcité evolves and can recognise and cooperate with religions (for similar
arguments, see Lamine 2004a). The inclusion of religious groups is facilitated in the case of
Rennes by the long history of amicable relationships between the civil and Catholic
authorities in the city and its strong civil society infrastructure. In Bordeaux, this is possible
due to the history of bilateral interreligious dialogue in the city and the close personal
relationship between the mayor and main religious representatives (Malogne-Fer 2019).
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Moreover, because Bordeaux Sharing is set up as an interfaith group, secular actors are
considered to be at odds with the activities of the group and are therefore excluded from it.
The reorientation of Toulouse Fraternity after the newmunicipal government took oﬃce
shows that political constellations diﬀer in their visions of laïcité and of the relationship
between state and religious representatives. The turn to a conservative government in
Toulouse is reﬂected in its understanding of laïcité. The new body aims to ‘favour the
recognition and respect of all religions that irrigate French society [. . .] and to grant free
religious expression’ (proposal for the creation of Toulouse Fraternity 12 December 2014),
a position which diﬀers signiﬁcantly from how the previous body and the Rennes commit-
tee – both of which were set up by socialist mayors – approached the matter.
Finally, the political culture of the city regarding citizen participation aﬀects the structure,
functioning, and outcomes of these bodies. This is very clear in the cases of Rennes and
Bordeaux, and less so in the case of Toulouse because of the extreme circumstances
produced by the terrorist attack. In Rennes this policy instrument reﬂects a relationship
between the state and stakeholders in which both parties are active players. This is the result
of a local political culture that has traditionally been grounded in strong citizen involve-
ment, proven by the local plan to promote citizen participation. In contrast, the more
personalistic governing style of the mayor in Bordeaux, linked to a history of strongmayors,
is reﬂected in the fact that Bordeaux Sharing was not set up to informmunicipal policies on
religious matters and it does not include representatives of secular civil society associations.
Rather it serves as a stage on which a symbolic representation of mutual understanding
between religions, orchestrated by the central ﬁgure of the mayor, is performed. As the
municipal politician in charge of Bordeaux Sharing put it in an interview conducted in
December 2016, ‘We have relations with religions to send a symbol that religious actors talk
to each other, talk to the mayor, and respect each other’ (emphasis mine). This approach
emphasises the symbolic and performative aspects, which can serve as ‘role models’ for the
wider population. In the case of Toulouse the terrorist attack geared measures towards
‘educating’ the public, in particular the youth, in topics related to republican values and
principles and the city’s history of migration, as a way to ﬁght the so-called ‘identity closure’
of certain groups.
Conclusion
In this article I have analysed the role of cities in the governance of Islam and of religion
more broadly. Focusing on three municipal consultative bodies set up to address issues of
religious diversity, the article has shown that policies on religion, even in centralised
countries like France, are not the exclusive monopoly of the central state. From the
perspective of public policy instruments, I have shown that – by treating these bodies as
policy instruments – we can grasp how they deﬁne a certain relationship between govern-
ment and governed (religious and non-religious actors), in which both are considered actors
of the governance of religion. These bodies epitomise the notion of ‘governing of and
through religion’, where religious actors participate in urban policymaking and the regula-
tion of religion.
Moreover, the analysis shows how these bodies draw on, and produce, knowledge
and expectations about public religious expressions that do not simply reproduce
national discussions and discourses on laïcité. Next to national legal and political
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frameworks, these bodies are crucial in setting the parameters that deﬁne ‘acceptable’
public religiosity as opposed to that which is considered illegitimate. By drafting
charters, giving ‘expert’ advice, and performing mutual understanding, they all contri-
bute to producing certain ideas of good/bad, acceptable/unacceptable religiosity,
thereby contributing to the ‘formatting’ of diverse religious practices and expressions
according to established (Christian) patterns (Roy 2013). ‘Acceptable’ religiosity, as
explicitly or implicitly prescribed by these bodies, is generally religiosity that is per-
formed in private and is not too visible, and does not feature traits of ‘communitarian-
ism’ deemed incompatible with republican citizenship.
In this sense, these bodies partly resemble national Islam councils in that they set the
conditions for (Islamic) religious practice. However, by incorporating members of multi-
ple religious traditions and secular associations, these bodies make the seemingly
intractable issue of regulating Islam less controversial. Moreover, the presence of other
religions can counterbalance attempts to regulate Islamic practices in ways that would
not be done with other religions.
These consultative bodies are thus not simply instrumental devices that provide
pragmatic recommendations for practical problems, nor are they merely implementing
a top-down mandate from the central state. These ‘invited spaces’ develop normative
deﬁnitions of accepted public religiosity that may ultimately aﬀect broader political
ideas of laïcité. As the study also shows, contextual factors matter, and shape these
urban responses to religious diversity in diﬀerent directions. This emphasises the need
to put cities at the centre of our analyses. Local factors such as the history of the
relationship between municipal and religious authorities, the political culture of the city
regarding citizen involvement, political constellations, and local violent events may all
play a role in relation to the setting up of these bodies, their composition, tasks, and
orientations, thereby ultimately aﬀecting the resulting deﬁnitions of laïcité.
Finally, these results show that the ways in which the principle of laïcité is interpreted and
applied to govern religion are varied and changing. While the national legal and political
frameworks set the basic parameters for the handling of religion, urban actors in cities can
also shape religion policies in signiﬁcant ways. This practical instantiation of the principle of
laïcité may ultimately also make it evolve in varying directions, challenging homogenising
ideas of state secularism in France, and beyond.
Notes
1. The notion of laïcité is widely used both in academia and in French public discourse,
referring to the right to freedom of religion and conscience, the separation of church and
state, and the neutrality of the state towards religious organisations in France. In this article
I treat it as a ‘category of practice’, used by multiple actors and requiring analysis, rather
than as a ‘category of analysis’ (Brubaker 2013). I therefore do not adopt an analytical
deﬁnition but instead examine the varied meanings attached to the term by diﬀerent actors
when they apply it in practice.
2. The term communautarisme is often used in public debates to refer to a perceived threat
posed to social cohesion by the formation of intermediate forms of sociality and claims-
making by minority groups that are seen as challenging universalist understandings of the
Republic. From a critical perspective, the discourse of communautarisme is understood as
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a strategy to delegitimise requests for recognition made by ethnic or religious minority
groups (Montague 2013).
3. My own translation from http://www.al1jup.com/rassembles-unis-soudes/.
4. The notion of ‘living together’, or vivre ensemble in French, is widely used in discussions on
religion in public life. It is both a legal construct and a term of common use. In its judgement
regarding the 2010 law prohibiting the concealment of the face in public spaces (case S.A.
S. v. France), the European Court of Human Rights refers to the so-called ‘French principle of
living together’ to support the argument made by the French legislature that covering one’s
face impedes human relationships, necessary for living in society. This was not uncontroversial
because of the perils of using general principles to limit religious freedom (Adrian 2017; Tsevas
2017). Moreover, vivre ensemble is also commonly used, but only seldom deﬁned, by a variety of
social and political actors when discussing laïcité. It often refers to social cohesion, some sort of
peaceful coexistence between people of diﬀerent religions and an attitude of respect and civic
behaviour. It is in this broader sense that the term is used in Bordeaux Sharing (Bordeaux
Partage).
5. Provision of halal and kosher products in public school canteens in France is rare if not
nonexistent because the purchase of such products by schools would be considered as
state funding of religious groups and thus in contravention of the 1905 law.
6. http://www.al1jup.com/bordeaux-partage/.
7. Author’s translation from http://www.bordeaux.fr/p81905/dialogue-inter-religieux.
8. I would like to thank Frank Laporte for sharing his research report ‘Toulouse Fraternité-
Conseil de la laïcité: Quelles politiques publiques municipales autour de la laïcité et de la
citoyanneté’ with me.
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